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Although Adam Smith (1759) was the first pioneers 
to analyse how norms, beliefs and culture etc. affect 
economic development, economists’ interest in the role 
of institutions has only developed in recent decades. 
Recently some institutional economists, such as the 
Nobel-prize winner Douglas C. North in 1993, claimed 
that “institutions matter” and  are quite important in 
understanding the broad history of economic growth 
(North, 1990).
One of the essential facts in the history of economic 
growth was the Industrial Revolution in Britain. At the 
beginning of the 1760s a sustained and rapid growth in 
per capita income occurred all over the word. Exactly, 
why this change occurred remains one of the key 
mysteries of economics. Central among the reasons 
offered is that potentially large one-time costs are 
involved in the creation of inventions. Examples of this 
phenomenon could include the production costs of the 
first prototypes of a steam engine or a computer etc., 
the infrastructural cost of rewriting national laws, and 
providing enforcement and other deadweight losses in 
terms of the differences between real and competitive 
markets. Basically, as it is accepted by mainstream 
growth theories, without these transaction costs the 
innovation (R&D) might not be sustained by inventors 
after they have created their inventions, unless they have 
some expectation of being able to capture some of the 
gains of efficient allocation in the form of profit (Coase, 
1960). Patents and copyrights are legal form of these 
mechanisms which “…grant investors monopoly power 
in order to allow them to obtain a return from their 
inventions.” (Jones, 2001: p. 86.). Intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) attempt to use legal systems to influence the 
degree of excludability of ideas. It might be quite easy 
for someone to “copy” an invention without any existing 
patents or copyrights. Moreover, the competition arising 
from this imitation eliminates the incentive for the 
investor to create the idea in the first place.
However, while the academic literature has claimed 
that the presence of strong intellectual property rights 
leads to greater economic growth and that IPRs are 
essential elements of a well-functioning economy, 
during the past decades has more attention been 
devoted in the economic literature to the concept of 
coercing properties (see Weingast, 1995; Djankov 
et al., 2002 etc.). Thus, new institutional economic 
theories – namely those of Williamson (2000) and 
Boettke et al. (2008) – dealing with levels of institutions 
and institutional stickiness emphasize the importance 
of the legal environment in which markets operate. 
Their common argument is that the core “informal” 
institutions (norms, culture) are fully embodied in the 
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stickiest “formal” exogenous institutions of a society 
(Figure 1). These include the security of property rights 
and the rule of law, which have incrementally altered 
over time in spontaneous and endogenous processes. 
In this sense, formal institutions are only beneficial 
in the presence of particular informal institutions 
(Williamson, 2009). Meanwhile, Diwan and Rodrik 
(1991) and Taylor (1994) also revealed that stronger 
IPRs may enhance global welfare and productivity.
On the other hand, Boldrin and Levine (2002) argued 
that new ideas should be protected and available for sale 
and “intellectual property” has come to mean not only 
the right to own and sell, but also the right to regulate its 
use. Hence, these institutions create socially inefficient 
markets and in this case they might be better defined 
as “intellectual monopolies”. Otherwise, according to 
Takalo and Kanniainen (2000) the strengthening of pa-
tent rights can delay the introduction of new technology 
to the market, and Bessen and Maskin (2000) also 
established that patent protection reduces innovation 
and social welfare.
However, outside these theoretical debates, 
scholars are commonly interested in examining the 
impact of formal institutions on economic perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, there is currently still quite 
some disagreement about whether IPRs matter directly 
for productivity growth and whether strengthening 
IPRs enhances the international competitiveness of 
industries. In this sense, these kinds of property rights 
can impact on productivity directly by affecting the 
technical efficiency of production as the primary 
engine of growth.
Since now, very little econometric evidences has 
been presented because measures of IPRs have been 
limited and the empirical growth studies have not been 
able to evaluate the impact on the growth of IPRs such 
as copyright and trade-marks etc. Gould and Gruben 
(1996) focused on how this effect depends on the degree 
of trade openness of different countries, while Ginarte 
and Park (1997) emphasized that patent rights could 
stimulate factor accumulation (human and physical 
capital), which, in turn, directly influences economic 
growth. In a related study, Siwek (2000) examined 
the importance of copyright industries for U.S. 
economic growth and found that copyright accounts 
for employment growth. Focusing on manufacturing 
industries in OECD countries Park (2003), found 
that both labour productivity and R&D expenditure 
increased with IPRs. In a larger sample of countries 
Kanwar and Evenson (2003) claimed that stronger pa-
tent rights were associated with higher R&D intensity 
(the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP). Hu and Png 
(2012) also demonstrated that more patent-intensive 
industries in these branches responded to stronger 
patent laws with higher growth, which resulted in 
increased GDP per capita.
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the 
direct relationships between IPRs and productivity 
growth in a sectoral approach. In our empirical research 
we predict that the correlation between patent rights and 
productivity, ceteris paribus, depends on the intensity 
of technology. In other worlds, IPRs give rise to more 
innovation in high-intensive branches than in less one, 
and generate more economic growth per capita through 
Figure 1
Levels of social analysis
Source: Williamson (2000: p. 597.)
Note: arrows represent constraints, and some feedback mechanisms are negligible according to Williamson
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new products and services. In our estimations we follow 
a specific taxonomy to identify the characteristics of 
productivity growth in different technology-intensive 
branches over the previous decades.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In 
the next sections we briefly describe the conceptual 
framework of IPRs with a Cobb-Douglas production 
function in the manufacturing industries of 14 OECD 
countries. Then we will demonstrate the results of our 
regression models with cross-industry panel data in 
order to investigate how employment, investment and 
IPRs directly affect productivity growth. The paper 
ends with some policy implications and conclusions. 
However, our motivation is not only to suggest a feasible 
point of reference for policy makers and the manage-
ment of SMEs in order to enhance better productivity 
growth performance, but also to outline the importance 
of property protection in a global context.
Databases and a technology-intensive 
taxonomy
A unique database has been constructed for the analysis of 
productivity growth in the framework of the EU KLEMS 
(2003) Project. This project aims to create a database 
which includes measures of output, employment, capital 
formation etc. at the industry level for various OECD 
countries from 1970 onwards. The latest (March 2011) 
release of the KLEMS (2014) database provides data up to 
2007 for a limited set of variables in different industries. 
Hence, in our estimations we should expand the given 
time series of gross value added (GVA) in constant 
(1995) prices. GVA is a measure used in economics as 
the value of goods and services produced in an area, 
industry or sector and is also equivalent to output (GDP) 
less intermediate consumption. The numbers of persons 
engaged in 56 separate industries were calculated 
and compared in the context of the economic and 
employment growth performance of each country. In our 
model specification we also need the share of investment 
within sectoral output for the OECD countries, which 
is calculated from the Penn World Table (PWT, 2014), 
included in Heston et al. (2006).
The industries were separated by the Indicators of 
activities for Industry and Services, based on ISIC Rev 
3. In our estimations we followed a specific taxonomy 
that was first introduced by Hatzichronoglou (1997) to 
identify the chief features of output per capita growth 
tendencies. This approach focuses on technology and 
distinguishes four different groups ranging from high 
to low-technology intensive branches. Table 1 lists the 
classification of manufacturing industries.
Scholars generally work with county specific 
datasets which are relatively easy to collect and which 
consist of a large amount of data to reflect the valid 
relationship between IPRs and economic growth. 
A measurement challenge was to quantify the strength 
of each country’s property rights to track its changes 
over time and evaluate the strength of the national pa-
tent regimes.
One of the popular approaches in the literature 
substitutes IPRs with composite indices; this was 
collected by Ginarte and Park (1997) and upgraded by 
Park (2008). The so-called “GP index” comprised five 
components, such as (1) extent of coverage of patent 
protection, (2) membership of international agreements, 
(3) provisions of loss protection, (4) enforcement 
mechanisms and (5) duration of protection. Another 
Table 1
Classification of manufacturing industries into categories based
on R&D intensities
Source: Hatzichronoglou (1997)
High-technology industries Medium-high-technology industries
Aircraft and spacecraft Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
Pharmaceuticals Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Office, accounting and computing machinery Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals
Radio, TV and communications equipment Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c.
Medical, precision and optical instruments Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
Medium-low-technology industries Low-technology industries
Building and repairing of ships and boats Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling
Rubber and plastics products Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel Food products, beverages and tobacco
Other non-metallic mineral products Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
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cross-country specific index to proxy the enforcement 
of property rights and legal systems is the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index 
which measures three subjective aspects of (1) the legal 
security of private ownership rights; (2) the viability 
of contracts and (3) the rule of law (Gwartney et al., 
2000). However, in spite of the serious limitations 
and some methodological critiques related to their 
subjectivity, scholars have often used these indices to 
measure national patent regimes. For instance (Figure 
2), demonstrates the predicted positive correlation 
between property rights and output per capita in 14 
OECD countries in 2011.
Other researchers – including myself – prefer to 
use primary datasets to examine the extent to which 
various kinds of IPRs might explain productivity 
growth directly. In this approach, the data were taken 
from the Statistics Database of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), compiled by WIPO 
in the processing of international applications through 
the Madrid and Hague systems. The robustness of our 
empirical model specifications will be simultaneously 
tested by the patent applications to the European Patent 
Office (EPO) available from the EUROSTAT (2014). 
The different kinds of IPRs are considered here as 
indicators of the total number patent (direct and national 
phase entries) and trademark applications (direct and 
via the Madrid system), and also patent applications 
made to the EPO. 
All in all, in both cases, we have an unbalanced pa-
nel data for each industry groups of 14 OECD countries 
to measure the existing relationship between IPRs 
and GDP per capita in different technology intensive 
branches.
Conceptual framework
In the neo-classical growth models, developed since 
their introduction in the 1950s by Solow (1956), 
no special attention was paid to market institutions. 
Basically, it was argued that the growth of physical 
capital accumulation had an effect on the growth of 
GDP, while the unexplained residual, labelled To-
Figure 2
The protection of property rights and output per capita 
of 14 OECD* countries in 2011
Source: own calculation, based on EFW(2014) and World Bank (2014)
Note: protection of property rights (in a scale of 0 to 10) in the horizontal axis and output per capita in constant 2005 $ prices 
in the vertical axis,* for AUR, AUS, DEN, CZE, FIN, GER, ITA, JPY, NED, SLO, SPA, SWE, UK, USA. 
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tal Factor Productivity (TFP), could not be measured 
directly. This made it possible to introduce institutions 
into new theories dealing with economic growth. But, 
contrary to what the neo-classical approach claims, 
economic growth should be determined within the 
models rather than being exogenously assumed.
Now, we will begin by reviewing what kind 
of relationship exists between productivity and 
institutions. First, we focus on a well-known formalised 
model specification, promoted earlier by Mankiw 
et al. (1992), for cross-county data (see Equation 1). 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, so 
production at time (t) can be written as:
 (1)
The notation is the standard, where (Y) represents 
output, (K) and (L) are capital and labour accumulation. 
Thus, we assume a constant return to scale and the 
magnitude of (1-α-β) should correspond roughly to the 
labour income share in total GDP, which is close to 1/3 
in most countries. The technical efficiency of production 
is denoted by (A), and is assumed to be a function of 
institutional factors such as IPRs. Holding other 
environmental and institutional factors constant, let
 (2)
where (IPR) denotes intellectual property rights and 
(γ) is the elasticity of technical efficiency with respect 
to the level of IPR. Therefore:
 (3)
where y=(Y/L), k=(K/L) as output per capita and the 
reproducible inputs are expressed in terms of efficiency 
labour units. In efficiency units, the equation of motion 
is the following:
 (4)
where (g) and (n) are the rates of growth of tech-
nical efficiency and of the labour force. (i
k
) denotes 
investment and (δ) the geometric rate of depreciation. 
Let i
k
=s
k
y, where (s
k
) is the respective savings rate from 
output. So, in the steady state:
(5)
Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation 
(1), and taking the logs of both sides of equation (1) 
and rearranging them yields the steady state level of 
productivity. So the log income per capita at a given 
time (t) equals with the following:
Empirical evidence for a sectoral approach
In our model specification, the economy tends 
towards a long run equilibrium. The extent of economic 
growth generally affects the rate at which per capita out-
put approaches its steady state value. Using (equation 
6) our regression model assumes the following formu-
la, which is tested in each of the different technology 
intensive sectors:
ln y
it
 = βo + β1 ln(sk)t + β2  ln(n + g  + δ)it
 
  + β
3 
 = 
 
ln(patent)
it
  +
  + β
4
 ln(trademark)
it
  + u
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  + e
it
The dependent variable (y
i,t
) is the ratio of real GVA 
per capita of a country (i) for the period (t) at a con-
stant price (2005). The first independent variable refers 
to the share of investment (s
k
) within sectoral output. 
Thus, (n) is the average growth rate of labour in dif-
ferent branches and (g)+(δ) are assumed to be constant 
(0.05), as in Mankiw et al. (1992). 
A patent is an exclusive right granted for an inven-
tion of a product or a process that provides new techni-
cal solutions, and protects for a limited period. Patents 
are measured here by using a proxy of the total patent 
applications (direct and PCT national phase entries), as 
(PTNW) taken from the WIPO (2014) database and by 
patent applications to the EPO by priority year at the 
national level, as the variable of (PTNE) from the EU-
ROSTAT (2014) database. 
A trademark is a characteristic sign, which identi-
fies certain goods or services as those which have been 
produced or provided by a specific person or enter-
prise. Over the years these “marks” have evolved into 
today’s system of trademark registration and protection 
for consumers, who also identify and purchase a prod-
uct and maintain its nature and quality. The variable of 
trademarks (TRMW) indicates the impact of total trade-
mark applications (direct and via the Madrid system) 
from the WIPO (2014). Finally, (u) is the between and 
(e) is the within entity error term.
Table 2 represents the corresponding results of our 
estimations in each sector. The first methodological 
problem was to identify whether the fixed or random 
effect regressions should be preferred experimentally. 
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In the random effects model, unlike the fixed effects 
model, the variation across entities is assumed to 
be random and uncorrelated with the independent 
variables included (Green, 2018: p. 183.). However, an 
advantage of random effects is that the time invariant 
variables are not absorbed by the intercept.
In the bottom section of this table we also show 
the results of Hausmann (H) and Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests. The first essentially 
tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the 
regressors; the null hypothesis is that they are not. The 
LM test support a decision between a random effect 
and a simple OLS regression. The null hypothesis is 
that variance across entities is zero. In other worlds, 
there is no significant difference across the units (i.e. 
no panel effect). The significance levels of these tests 
in all branches suggested that a random effect model 
specification should be preferred.
As would be expected according to neoclassical 
growth theories, an increase in the share of investment 
within output acts pro-cyclically and correlated 
positively with productivity in our basic models; 
however, this is not robust in all of the examined 
sectors. Lack of significance, in this case, could mean 
that changing investment does not indicate productivity 
growth in these branches at a given level of other 
determinants. Thus, in our results, the attainment of 
employment growth is negatively related to output per 
capita in (HT), (MHT) and (MLT) branches. However, 
if employment increases in the high-technology 
intensive (HT) branches it might affect productivity 
growth least of all.
Dependent variable: ln(Y)
it
 
Independent 
Variables/
Sectors 
High (HT) High (HT)
Medium
high
(MHT)
Medium
high
(MHT)
Medium
low 
(MLT)
Medium
low
(MLT)
Low
(LT)
 
Low 
(LT)
 
constant 0.607 –3.171 1.419 1.638 2.875 2.221 3.208 3.531
 (0,48) (–2,53)** (2,11)** (2,86)*** (4,76)*** (2,07)** (5,41)*** (4,78)***
ln(sk)
it
1.645 –0.229 0.93 0.059 0.474 –0.201 0.341 –0.481
 (4,66)*** (–0,81) (6,23)*** (0,61) (4,12)*** (–0,88) (3,04)*** (–0,42)
ln(ni+g+δ)
t
–2.816 –2.278 –1.045 0,312 –1.229 –0.693 –0.196 0,139
 (–3,48)*** (–3,8)*** (–2,59)** (1,24) (-3,81)*** (–2,64)*** (–0,66) (0,03)
ln(PTNW)
it
 0,281  0,004  0,022  –0.053
  (3,81)***  (0,16)  (0,44)  (–0,87)
ln(TRMW)
it
 0,281  0,118  0,109  0,127
  (4,82)***  (3,81)***  (2,03)***  (3,17)***
ln(PTNE)
it
 0,281  0,314  0,229  0,231
  (10,16)***  (14,43)***  (5,29)***  (5,27)***
Observations 347 322 347 322 347 322 347 322
Countries 14
R2 within 0,087 0,584 0,149 0,711 0,120 0,653 0,026 0,707
R2 between 0,012 0,073 0,031 0,074 0,027 0,091 0,018 0,041
R2 overall 0,051 0,091 0,061 0,083 0,049 0,087 0,049 0,035
Wald-test 31,98*** 425,5*** 58,7*** 738,6*** 46,21*** 91,86*** 9,25** 344,12***
Hausman-test 0,994 0,961 0,981 0,934 0,973 0,912 0,985 0,936
LM-test 3086,8*** 2934,9*** 3908,3*** 3366,7*** 3794,1*** 3544,2*** 3850,1*** 3523,51***
Table 2.
Results of random-effect panel regression in each technology-intensive sector,
1980–2007
Source: own calculation, based on EFW(2014), EUROSTAT(2014), KLEMS (2014) and PWT(2014)
Notes: * Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: ***: signifi-
cance at 1 per cent, **: 5 per cent, *: 10 per cent. P-values without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at 
the 10 per cent level.
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In order to exemplify the robustness check of our 
estimations we measured the impact of IPRs on out-
put per capita with different proxies in each branch. 
Essentially, the effect of patents and trademarks on 
productivity does not seem to be large in our models. 
The coefficients range from circa 0.1% to 0.31%. 
However, a 1% increase in the level of patents in 
(PTNW) results in an increase (0.28%) of productivity 
in (HT) branches. Nevertheless, trademarks (TRMW) 
are also positively correlated with productivity growth 
in both models with existing significant z-statistics. 
Thus, as we can demonstrate, the degree of correlation 
between patent rights and productivity, ceteris paribus, 
depends on the intensity of the technology in question. 
In other worlds, IPRs might generate more economic 
growth per capita in the high-intensive branches than 
in less intensive ones. All in all, these results obviously 
imply the existence of a positive relationship between 
IPRs and productivity among the examined OECD 
countries in both sectors.
Conclusion
According to the institutional economics thesis the role 
of IPRs is one of the relevant determinants of economic 
growth in long run. Although recently there have been 
serious theoretical debates which have attempted to 
explain the impact of institutions and their interactions 
in terms of how they might influence productivity, 
no clear consensus has yet emerged and several 
unanswered problems remained. However, scholars 
nowadays are commonly interested in examining 
how these formal institutions matter, as far as the 
restricted amount of econometric evidence allows. So 
far, measures of IPRs have been limited and empirical 
studies have not been able to evaluate their impacts 
on productivity growth. The major conclusion that 
can be drawn from our estimations is that the extent 
to which patent rights and trademarks, ceteris paribus, 
positively correlated with output per capita depends on 
the intensity of technology.
The European Union (EU) has developed the Eu-
rope 2020 Strategy (EU, 2010) to transform Europe-
an countries into a smart, sustainable and inclusive 
economy that delivers high levels of employment, 
productivity and social cohesion. In this sense, 
worldwide competition through innovation means 
that better valorisation of patents must be considered 
in a global context to ease the access of SMEs to 
knowledge markets. It points out that a novel policy 
option could imply the development of local innovation 
systems to benefit the EU growth strategy. We can 
advise SMEs to enhance the value of their intellectual 
assets in innovation management and we suggest that 
their property rights must be protected and enforced 
better than has previously been the case. The social, 
economic and environmental benefits etc. of IPRs are 
only gained through what actions enterprises take to 
ensure they obtain patents for their inventions of good 
or services (EC, 2012).
An additional research direction has also emerged 
in this study. We argue that the institutional economic 
perspective is relevant since it extends the achievements 
and existing frontiers of macroeconomic theories. We 
argue that, related to the results of Novotny (2013), 
stronger patent rights in developing countries help to 
secure greater technology transfer in these industries. 
Hence, further research in this sectoral approach could 
be more fruitful.
Endnotes
 1 “This research was realized in the framework of TÁMOP 
4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-0001 »National Excellence Program – 
Elaborating and operating an inland student and researcher 
personal support system«. The project was subsidized by the Eu-
ropean Union and co-financed by the European Social Fund.”
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